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Abstract
In this paper we prove lower and matching upper bounds for the number of servers required to
implement a regular shared register that tolerates unsynchronizedMobile Byzantine failures. We consider
the strongest model of Mobile Byzantine failures to date: agents are moved arbitrarily by an omniscient
adversary from a server to another in order to deviate their computation in an unforeseen manner. When
a server is infected by an Byzantine agent, it behaves arbitrarily until the adversary decides to “move” the
agent to another server. Previous approaches considered asynchronous servers with synchronous mobile
Byzantine agents (yielding impossibility results), and synchronous servers with synchronous mobile
Byzantine agents (yielding optimal solutions for regular register implementation, even in the case where
servers and agents periods are decoupled).
We consider the remaining open case of synchronous servers with unsynchronized agents, that can
move at their own pace, and change their pace during the execution of the protocol. Most of our findings
relate to lower bounds, and characterizing the model parameters that make the problem solvable. It turns
out that unsynchronized mobile Byzantine agent movements requires completely new proof arguments,
that can be of independent interest when studying other problems in this model. Additionally, we propose
a generic server-based algorithm that emulates a regular register in this model, that is tight with respect
to the number of mobile Byzantine agents that can be tolerated. Our emulation spans two awareness
models: servers with and without self-diagnose mechanisms. In the first case servers are aware that the
mobile Byzantine agent has left and hence they can stop running the protocol until they recover a correct
state while in the second case, servers are not aware of their faulty state and continue to run the protocol
using an incorrect local state.
1 Introduction
Byzantine fault tolerance is a fundamental building block in distributed system, as Byzantine failures include
all possible faults, attacks, virus infections and arbitrary behaviors that can occur in practice (even unfore-
seen ones). The classical setting considers Byzantine participants remain so during the entire execution, yet
software rejuvenation techniques increase the possibility that a corrupted node does not remain corrupted
during the whole system execution and may be aware of its previously compromised status [19].
Mobile Byzantine Failures (MBF) models have been recently introduced to integrate those concerns.
Then, faults are represented by Byzantine agents that are managed by an omniscient adversary that “moves”
them from a host process to another, an agent being able to corrupt its host in an unforeseen manner. MBF
investigated so far consider mostly round-based computations, and can be classified according to Byzantine
mobility constraints: (i) constrained mobility [9] agents may only move from one host to another when
protocol messages are sent (similarly to how viruses would propagate), while (ii) unconstrained mobility [2,
4, 10, 15, 16, 17] agents may move independently of protocol messages. In the case of unconstrained
mobility, several variants were investigated [2, 4, 10, 15, 16, 17]: Reischuk [16] considers that malicious
agents are stationary for a given period of time, Ostrovsky and Yung [15] introduce the notion of mobile
viruses and define the adversary as an entity that can inject and distribute faults; finally, Garay [10], and
more recently Banu et al. [2], and Sasaki et al. [17] and Bonnet et al. [4] consider that processes execute
synchronous rounds composed of three phases: send, receive, and compute. Between two consecutive such
synchronous rounds, Byzantine agents can move from one node to another. Hence the set of faulty hosts
at any given time has a bounded size, yet its membership may evolve from one round to the next. The
main difference between the aforementioned four works [2, 4, 10, 17] lies in the knowledge that hosts have
about their previous infection by a Byzantine agent. In Garay’s model [10], a host is able to detect its own
infection after the Byzantine agent left it. Sasaki et al. [17] investigate a model where hosts cannot detect
when Byzantine agents leave. Finally, Bonnet et al. [4] considers an intermediate setting where cured hosts
remain in control on the messages they send (in particular, they send the same message to all destinations,
and they do not send obviously fake information, e.g. fake id). Those subtle differences on the power of
Byzantine agents turns out to have an important impact on the bounds for solving distributed problems.
A first step toward decoupling algorithm rounds from mobile Byzantine moves is due to Bonomi et
al. [8]. In their model, mobile Byzantine movements are either: (i) synchronized, but the period of movement
is independent to that of algorithm rounds, (ii) independent time bounded, meaning that Byzantine agents
are only requested to remain some minimum amount of time at any occupied node, or (iii) independent time
unbounded, which can be seen as a special case of (ii) when the minimum amount of time is one time unit.
In particular, the Bonomi et al. [8] model implies that Byzantine moves are no more related to messages that
are exchanged through the protocol.
Register Emulation. Traditional solutions to build a Byzantine tolerant storage service (a.k.a. register
emulation) can be divided into two categories: replicated state machines [18], and Byzantine quorum sys-
tems [3, 12, 14, 13]. Both approaches are based on the idea that the current state of the storage is replicated
among processes, and the main difference lies in the number of replicas that are simultaneously involved
in the state maintenance protocol. Several works investigated the emulation of self-stabilizing or pseudo-
stabilizing Byzantine tolerant SWMR or MWMR registers [1, 7, 6]. All these works do not consider the
complex case of mobile Byzantine faults. Recently, Bonomi et al. [5] proposed optimal self-stabilizing
atomic register implementations for round-based synchronous systems under the four Mobile Byzantine
models described in [2, 4, 10, 17]. The round-free model [8] where Byzantine moves are decoupled from
protocol rounds also enables optimal solutions (with respect to the number of Byzantine agents) for the
implementation of regular registers. However, this last solution requires Byzantine agents to move in syn-
chronous steps, whose duration for the entire execution is fixed, so the movements of Byzantine agents
is essentially synchronous. As it is impossible to solve the register emulation problem when processes are
asynchronous and Byzantine agents are synchronous [8], the only case remaining open is that of synchronous
processes and unsynchronized Byzantine agents.
Our Contribution. We relax the main assumption made for obtaining positive results in the round-free
model: Byzantine moves are no more synchronized. The main contribution of this paper is to thoroughly
study the impact of unsynchronized mobile Byzantine agents on the register emulation problem. We present
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Table 1: Summary of lower bounds in different system models. δ is the upper bound on the message delay,
and ∆ is the period for synchronized agent moves (in the synchronous agents setting) or the lower bound
for an agent to remain on a server (in the unsynchronized agents setting).
Round-based model [5]
Burhman Garay Bonnet Sasaki
2f + 1 3f + 1 4f + 1 4f + 1
Round-free model
Agents moves Synchronized Unsynchronized
[8] [this paper]
Cured state awareness Aware Unaware Aware Unaware
δ ≤ ∆ < 2δ 5f + 1 8f + 1 6f + 1 12f + 1
2δ ≤ ∆ < 3δ 4f + 1 5f + 1 4f + 1 7f + 1
lower and matching upper bounds for implementing a regular register in the unsynchronized mobile Byzan-
tine model. We first explore and characterize the key parameters of the model that enable problem solvabil-
ity. As expected, the lower bounds results require completely new proof techniques that are of independent
interest while studying other classical problems in the context of unsynchronized mobile Byzantine agents.
When the problem is solvable, it turns out that minor changes to existing quorum-based protocols joint with
smart choices of quorums thresholds command optimal resilience (with respect to the number of Byzantine
agents). Table 1 summarizes all the lower bounds for the various models, the newly obtained results are
presented in boldface.
2 System Model
We consider a distributed system composed of an arbitrary large set of client processes C, and a set of n
server processes S = {s1, s2 . . . sn}. Each process in the distributed system (i.e., both servers and clients) is
identified by a unique identifier. Servers run a distributed protocol emulating a shared memory abstraction,
and clients are unaware of the protocol run by the servers.The passage of time is measured by a fictional
global clock (e.g., that spans the set of natural integers), whose processes are unaware of.At each time
instant t, each process (either client or server) is characterized by its internal state, i.e., by the set of its local
variables and their assigned values. We assume that an arbitrary number of clients may crash, and that up to
f servers host, at any time t, a Byzantine agent. Furthermore, servers processes execute the same algorithm,
and cannot rely on high level primitives such as consensus or total order broadcast.
Communication model. Processes communicate through message passing. In particular, we assume that:
(i) each client ci ∈ C can communicate with every server through a broadcast() primitive, (ii) each server can
communicate with every other server through a broadcast() primitive, and (iii) each server can communicate
with a particular client through a send() unicast primitive. We assume that communications are authenticated
(i.e., given a messagem, the identity of its sender cannot be forged) and reliable (i.e., spurious messages are
not created and sent messages are neither lost nor duplicated).
Timing Assumptions. The system is round-free synchronous in the sense that: (i) the processing time of
local computations (except for wait statements) are negligible with respect to communication delays, and are
assumed to be equal to 0, and (ii) messages take time to travel to their destination processes. In particular,
concerning point-to-point communications, we assume that if a process sends a message m at time t then
it is delivered by time t + δp (with δp > 0). Similarly, let t be the time at which a process p invokes the
broadcast(m) primitive, then there is a constant δb (with δb ≥ δp) such that all servers have delivered m at
time t + δb. For the sake of presentation, in the following we consider a unique message delivery delay δ
(equal to δb ≥ δp), and assume δ is known to every process.
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Computation model. Each process of the distributed system executes a distributed protocol P that is com-
posed by a set of distributed algorithms. Each algorithm in P is represented by a finite state automaton and it
is composed of a sequence of computation and communication steps. A computation step is represented by
the computation executed locally to each process while a communication step is represented by the sending
and the delivering events of a message. Computation steps and communication steps are generally called
events.
Definition 1 (Execution History) Let P be a distributed protocol. Let H be the set of all the events gen-
erated by P at any process pi in the distributed system and let → be the happened-before relation. An
execution history (or simply history) Hˆ = (H,→) is a partial order on H satisfying the relation →.
Definition 2 (Valid State at time t) Let Hˆ = (H,→) be an execution history of a generic computation and
let P be the corresponding protocol. Let pi be a process and let statepi be the state of pi at some time t.
statepi is said to be valid at time t if it can be generated by executing P on Hˆ .
MBF model. We now recall the generalized Mobile Byzantine Failure model [8]. Informally, in the MBF
model, when a Byzantine agent is hosted by a process, the agent takes entire control of its host making it
Byzantine faulty (i.e., it can corrupt the host’s local variables, forces it to send arbitrary messages, etc.).
Then, the Byzantine agent leaves its host with a possible corrupted state (that host is called cured) before
reaching another host.We assume that any process previously hosting a Byzantine agent has access to a
tamper-proof memory storing the correct protocol code. However, a cured server may still have a corrupted
internal state, and thus cannot be considered correct. The moves of a Byzantine agent are controlled by an
omniscient adversary.
Definition 3 (Correct process at time t) Let Hˆ = (H,→) be a history, and let P be the protocol generat-
ing Hˆ . A process is correct at time t if (i) it is correctly executing P, and (ii) its state is valid at time t. We
denote by Co(t) the set of correct processes at time t. Given a time interval [t, t′], we denote by Co([t, t′])
the set of all processes that remain correct during [t, t′] (i.e., Co([t, t′]) =
⋂
τ ∈ [t,t′]Co(τ)).
Definition 4 (Byzantine process at time t) Let Hˆ = (H,→) be a history, and let P be the protocol gener-
ating Hˆ . A process is Byzantine at time t if it is controlled by a Byzantine agent and does not execute P. We
denote by B(t) the set of Byzantine processes at time t. Given a time interval [t, t′], we denote by B([t, t′])
the set of all processes that remain Byzantine during [t, t′] (i.e., B([t, t′]) =
⋂
τ ∈ [t,t′]B(τ)).
Definition 5 (Cured process at time t) Let Hˆ = (H,→) be a history, and let P be the protocol generating
Hˆ . A process is cured at time t if (i) it is correctly executing P, and (ii) its state is not valid at time t. We
denote by Cu(t) the set of cured processes at time t. Given a time interval [t, t′], we denote by Cu([t, t′])
the set of all processes that remain cured during [t, t′] (i.e., Cu([t, t′]) =
⋂
τ ∈ [t,t′]Cu(τ)).
With respect to the movements of agents, we consider the independent time-bounded (ITB) model:
each mobile Byzantine agent mai is forced to remain on a host for at least a period ∆i. Given two mobile
Byzantine Agents mai and maj , their movement periods ∆i and ∆j may be different. Note that previous
results considering decoupled Byzantine moves [8] were established in the weaker ∆-synchronized model,
where the external adversary moves all controlled mobile Byzantine agents at the same time t, and their
movements happen periodically with period ∆. None of those properties remain valid in our model.
Concerning the knowledge that each process has about its failure state, we distinguish the following two
cases: Cured Aware Model (CAM): at any time t, every process is aware about its failure state; Cured
Unaware Model (CUM): at any time t, every process is not aware about its failure state.
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We assume that the adversary can control at most f Byzantine agents at any time (i.e., Byzantine agents
do not replicate while moving). In our work, only servers can be affected by the mobile Byzantine agents1.
It follows that, at any time t |B(t)| ≤ f . However, during the system lifetime, all servers may be hosting a
Byzantine agent at some point (i.e., none of the servers is guaranteed to remain correct forever).
Register Specification.
A register is a shared variable accessed by a set of processes, called clients, through two operations,
namely read and write. Informally, the write operation updates the value stored in the shared variable, while
the read obtains the value contained in the variable (i.e., the last written value). Every operation issued on a
register is, generally, not instantaneous and it can be characterized by two events occurring at its boundaries:
an invocation event and a reply event. These events occur at two time instants (called the invocation time
and the reply time) according to the fictional global time.
An operation op is complete if both the invocation event and the reply event occurred, otherwise, it
failed.Given two operations op and op′, their invocation times (tB(op) and tB(op
′)) and reply times (tE(op)
and tE(op
′)), op precedes op′ (op ≺ op′) if and only if tE(op) < tB(op
′). If op does not precede op′ and op′
does not precede op, then op and op′ are concurrent (noted op||op′). Given a write(v) operation, the value v
is said to be written when the operation is complete.
In this paper, we consider a single-writer/multi-reader (SWMR) regular register, as defined by Lam-
port [11], which is specified as follows:
— Termination: if a correct client invokes an operation op, op completes.
— Validity: A read returns the last written value before its invocation (i.e. the value written by the latest
completed write preceding it), or a value written by a write concurrent with it.
3 Lower bounds
In this section we prove lower bounds with respect to the minimum fraction of correct servers to imple-
ment safe registers in presence of mobile Byzantine failures 2. In particular we first prove lower bounds
for the (∆S,CAM) and (∆S,CUM) models and then we extend those results to (ITB,CAM) and
(ITB,CUM)models. The first observation that raises is that in presence of mobile agents in the round-free
models there are several parameters to take into account with respect to the round-based model. Let us start
considering that the set of Byzantine servers changes its composition dynamically time to time. This yields
to the following question: does it impact on the read() duration? Or, in other words, such operation has to
last as less as possible or until it eventually terminates? In this chapter we consider the read() operation
duration as a parameter itself, allowing us to easily verify when the variation of such parameter has any
impact on lower bounds. Here below the list of parameters we take into account.
• servers knowledge about their failures state (CAM,CUM );
• the relationship between δ and ∆ (that states how many Byzantine servers there may be during an
operation);
• Tr, the read() operations duration;
1It is trivial to prove that in our model, if clients are Byzantine, it is impossible to implement deterministically even a safe
register. A Byzantine client may always introduce a corrupted value, and a server cannot distinguish between a correct client and a
Byzantine one.
2Results on safe register can be directly extended to the other register specifications.
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• γ, the upper bound on the time during which a server can be in a cured state (the design of an optimal
maintenance() operation is out of the scope of this thesis, thus we use such upper bound as another
parameter).
Those parameters allow us to describe different failure models and help us to provide a general framework
that produces lower bounds for each specific instance of the MBF models. In the sequel it will be clear
that γ varies depending on the coordinated/uncoordinated mobile agents movements (∆S, ITB, ITU ). In
other words, in this parameter is hidden the movements model taken into account, so we do not need to
explicitly parametrize it. Before to start let us precise that we do not consider the following algorithm
families: (i) full information algorithm families (processes exchange information at each time instant); (ii)
algorithms characterized by a read operation that does not require a request-reply pattern; (iii) algorithms
with non quiescent operation (the message exchange triggered by an operation eventually terminates); and
finally (iv) algorithms where clients interact with each other. All results presented in the sequel consider a
families of algorithms such that previous characteristics do not hold. The lower bounds proof leverages on
the classical construction of two indistinguishable executions. The tricky part is to characterize the set of
messages delivered by a client from correct and incorrect servers depending of the read() operation duration.
Let Tr, Tr ≥ 2δ be such duration, each read() operation requires at least a request-reply pattern). We first
characterize the correct and incorrect sets of messages, delivered during Tr time, with respect to ∆ and γ.
For clarity, in the sequel we note correct message/request/reply a message that carries a valid value when
it is sent (i.e., sent by a correct process). Otherwise, the message is incorrect. It has been proven [8] that a
protocol Preg implementing a regular register in a mobile Byzantine setting must include in addition to the
mandatory read and write operations an additional operation, maintenance, defined below.
Definition 6 (Maintenance operation maintenance) A maintenance operation is an operation that, when
executed by a process pi, terminates at some time t leaving pi with a valid state at time t (i.e., it guarantees
that pi is correct at time t).
Such operation has a direct impact on the number of correct processes in any time instant. For that reason
it is important to characterize its duration, in particular its upper bound in terms of time. The following
definition defines γ, the upper bound of the time during which a server can be in a cured state.
Definition 7 (Curing time, γ) We define γ as the maximum time a server can be in a cured state. More
formally, let Tc the time at which server sc is left by a mobile agent, let opM the first maintenance operation
that correctly terminates, then tE(opM )− Tc ≤ γ.
In order to build our indistinguishable execution, we define below a scenario of agents movement. Then,
with respect this scenario, we construct two indistinguishable executions.
Definition 8 (Scenario S∗) Let S∗ be the following scenario: for each time Ti, i ≥ 0 the affected servers
are s(i mod n)f+1, . . . , s(i mod n)f+f .
In Figure 1 is depicted S∗. In particular, the red part is the time where f agents are affecting f servers
and the gray part is the time servers are running the maintenance operation.
Let us characterize the Preg protocol in the most general possible way. By definition a register ab-
straction involves read() and write() operations issued by clients. A read operation involves at least a
request− reply communication pattern (i.e., two communication steps). Thus, given the system synchrony,
a read() operation opR lasts at least Tr ≥ 2δ time. Moreover we consider that a correct server sends a reply
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. . .
Figure 1: Representation of S∗ where mobile agents affect groups of f different servers each Ti period. In
particular here γ > ∆.
message in two occasions: (i) after the delivery of a requestmessage, and (ii) right after it changes its state,
at the end of the maintenance operation if an opR is occurring. The latter case exploits the maintenance
operation allowing servers to reply with a valid value in case they were Byzantine at the beginning of the
read operation. Moreover we assume that in (∗, CAM) model servers in a cured state do not participate to
the read operation. Notice that those servers are aware of their current cured state and are aware of their
impossibility to send correct replies. Even though those may seems not very general assumptions, let us just
consider that we are allowing servers to correctly contribute to the computation as soon as they can and stay
silent when they can not and under those assumptions we prove lower bounds. Thus if we remove those
assumptions the lower bounds do not decreases. Scenario and protocol has been characterized. Now we aim
to characterize the set of servers, regarding their failure states, that can appear during the execution of the
protocol, in particular during the read() operation. Those sets allow us to characterize correct and incorrect
messages that a client delivers during a read() operation.
Definition 9 (Failure State of servers in a time interval) Let [t, t+Tt] be a time interval and let t
′, t′ > 0,
be a time instant. Let si be a server and statei be si state, statei ∈ {correct, cured,Byzantine}. Let
S(t′) be the set of servers si that are in the state statei at t
′, S(t′) ∈ {Co(t′), Cu(t′), B(t′)}. S˜(t, t + Tr)
is the set of servers that have been in the state statei for at least one time unit during [t, t + Tr]. More
formally, S˜(t, t+ Tr) =
⋃
t≤t′≤t+Tr
S(t′).
Definition 10 ( ˜CBC(t, t+ Tr)) Let [t, t + Tr] be a time interval, ˜CBC(t, t + Tr) denotes servers that
during a time interval [t, t+Tr] belong first to B˜(t, t+Tr) or Cu(t) (only in (∆S,CUM) model) and then
to Co(t+ δ, t + Tr − δ) or vice versa.
In particular let us denote:
• B˜C(t, t+ Tr) servers that during a time interval [t, t+ Tr] belong to B˜(t, t+ Tr) or Cu(t) (only in
(∆S,CUM) model) and to C˜o(t+ δ, t+ Tr − δ).
• C˜B(t, t + Tr) servers that during a time interval [t, t + Tr] belong to C˜o(t + δ, t + Tr − δ) and to
B˜(t, t+ Tr).
Definition 11 (Sil(t, t+ Tr)) Let [t, t+Tr] be a time interval. Sil(t, t+Tr) is the set of servers inCu(t, t+
TR − δ).
Servers belonging to Sil(tB(opR), tE(opR)) are servers that do no participate to opR. In oder words,
those servers in the worst case scenario became correct after tE(opR) − δ, thus if they send back a correct
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s1
s2
s3
t′ t′ + 3δ t′′ t′′ + 3δ
Figure 2: Let [t, t+Tr] be time a interval such that in the given scenario |B˜(t, t+Tr)| = MaxB˜(t, t+Tr).
In particular we have that in the time interval [t′, t′+ Tr], |B˜(t
′, t′+ Tr)| = MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr). While in the
time interval [t′′, t′′ + Tr], |B˜(t
′′, t′′ + Tr)| < MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr).
reply it is not sure that client delivers such reply before the end of Tr time. Now we can define the worst
case scenarios for the sets we defined so far with respect to S∗.
Definition 12 (MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr)) Let S be a scenario and [t, t + Tr] a time interval. The cardinality of
B˜S(t, t+ Tr) is maximum with respect to S if for any t
′, t′ > 0, we have that |B˜S(t, t+ Tr)| ≥ |B˜S(t
′, t′ +
Tr)|. Then we call the value of such cardinality asMaxB˜S (t, t+ Tr). If we consider only one scenario per
time then we can omit the subscript related to the scenario and write directly MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr).
This value quantifies in the worst case scenario how many servers can be Byzantine, for at least one
time unit, during a read() operation. Figure 2 depicts a scenario where Tr = 3δ and during the time interval
[t′, t′+Tr] there is a maximum number of Byzantine servers while in [t
′′, t′′+Tr] this number is not maximal.
Definition 13 (MaxSil(t, t+ Tr)) Let S be a scenario and [t, t + Tr] a time interval. The cardinality
of SilS(t, t + Tr) is maximum with respect to S if for any t
′, t′ ≥ 0 we have that |Sil(t, t + Tr)| ≥
|Sil(t′, t′ + Tr)| and B˜(t, t + Tr) = MaxB˜(t, t + Tr). Then we call the value of such cardinality as
MaxSilS(t, t+Tr). If we consider only one scenario per time then we can omit the subscript related to the
scenario and write directly minSil(t, t+ Tr).
This value quantifies the maximum number of servers that begin in a cured state a read() operation and
are still cured after Tr − δ time. So that any correct reply sent after such period has no guarantees to be
delivered by the client and such servers are assumed to be silent.
Definition 14 (MaxCu(t)) Let S be a scenario and t be a time instant. The cardinality of CuS(t) is
maximum with respect to S if for any t′, t′ ≥ 0, we have that |CuS(t
′)| ≤ |CuS(t)| and B˜(t, t + Tr) =
MaxB˜(t, t + Tr). We call the value of such cardinality as MaxCuS(t). If we consider only one scenario
per time then we can omit the subscript related to it and write directly MaxCu(t).
This value quantifies, in the worst case scenario, how many cured servers there may be at the beginning
of a read() operation. Figure 3 depicts a scenario where at time t′ there are the maximum number of cured
server while at t′′ this value is not maximum. Notice that in such figure, in case of a shorter time interval
[t′, t′ + 2δ] s0 would be silent.
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s0
s1
s2
s3
t′ t′ + 3δ t′′ t′′ + 3δ
Figure 3: Let us consider the time instant t and the depicted scenario such that |Cu(t)| = MaxCu(t). In
particular, in this case |Cu(t′)| = MaxCu(t) and |Cu(t′′)| < MaxCu(t).
s0
s1
s2
s3
t′ t′ + 3δ t′′ t′′ + 3δ
Figure 4: Let [t, t+Tr] be a time interval such that in the depicted scenario |C˜o(t, t+Tr)| = minC˜o(t, t+
Tr). Then in both time intervals [t
′, t′ + Tr] and [t
′′, t′′ + Tr] we have that |C˜o(t
′, t′ + Tr)| = |C˜o(t
′′, t′′ +
Tr)| = minC˜o(t, t+ Tr).
Definition 15 (minC˜o(t, t+ Tr)) Let S be a scenario and [t, t+ Tr] be a time interval thenminC˜S(t, t+
Tr) denotes the minimum number of correct servers during a time interval [t+ δ, t+Tr− δ]. If we consider
only one scenario per time then we can omit the subscript related to it and write directly minC˜(t, t+ Tr).
Figure 4 depicts a scenario where during the both intervals [t′, t′ + Tr] and [t
′′, t′′ + Tr] the number of
correct servers is minimum.
Definition 16 (min ˜CBC(t, t+ Tr)) Let [t, t+Tr] be a time interval thenmin ˜CBC(t, t+Tr) denotes the
minimum number of servers that during a time interval [t, t+Tr] belong first to B˜(t, t+Tr) or Cu(t) (only
in (∆S,CUM) model) and then to Co(t+δ, t+Tr−δ) or vice versa and B˜(t, t+Tr) = MaxB˜(t, t+Tr).
In particular let us denote as:
• minB˜C(t, t + Tr) the minimum number of servers that during a time interval [t, t + Tr] belong to
B˜(t, t+ Tr) or Cu(t) (only in (∆S,CUM) model) and to C˜o(t+ δ, t + Tr − δ).
• minC˜B(t, t + Tr) the minimum number of servers that during a time interval [t, t + Tr] belong to
C˜o(t+ δ, t+ Tr − δ) and to B˜(t, t+ Tr).
As we stated before, Byzantine servers set changes during the read() operation opR, so there can be
servers that are in a Byzantine state at tB(opR) and in a correct state before tE(opR) − δ (cf. s0 during
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s3
t′ t′ + 3δ t′′ t′′ + 3δ
Figure 5: Let [t, t+Tr] a time interval such that in the depicted scenario ˜CBC(t, t+Tr) = min ˜CBC(t, t+
Tr). Then ˜CBC(t
′, t′ + Tr) > min ˜CBC(t, t+ Tr) and ˜CBC(t
′′, t′′ + Tr) = min ˜CBC(t, t+ Tr).
[t′, t′ + 3δ] time interval in Figure 5). Those servers contribute with an incorrect message at the beginning
and with a correct message after. The same may happen with servers that are correct from tB(opR) to at
least tB(opR)+δ (so that for sure deliver the read request message and send the reply back) and are affected
by a mobile agent after tB(opR) + δ (cf. s0 during [t
′′, t′′ + 3δ] time interval in Figure 5).
Lemma 1 MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr) = (⌈
Tr
∆ ⌉+ 1)f .
Proof For simplicity let us consider a single agent mak, then we extend the same reasoning to all the f
agents. In [t, t + Tr] time interval, with Tr ≥ 2δ, mak can affect a different server each ∆ time. It follows
that the number of times it may change server is Tr∆ . Thus the affected servers are ⌈
Tr
∆ ⌉ plus the server that
was affected at t. Finally, extending the reasoning to f agents, MaxB˜(t, t + Tr) = (⌈
Tr
∆ ⌉ + 1)f , which
concludes the proof. ✷
As we see in the sequel, the value of MaxB˜(t, t + Tr) is enough to compute the lower bound. Now
we can define the worst case scenario for a read() operation with respect to S∗. Let op be a read operation
issued by ci. We want to define, among the messages that can be deliver by ci during op, the minimum
amount of messages sent by server when they are in a correct state and the maximum amount of messages
sent by servers when they are not in a correct state.
In each scenario, we assume that each message sent to or by Byzantine servers is instantaneously delivered,
while each message sent to or by correct servers requires δ time. Without loss of generality, let us assume that
all Byzantine servers send the same value and send it only once, for each period where they are Byzantine.
Moreover, we make the assumption that each cured server (in the CAM model) does not reply as long as it
is cured. Yet, in the CUM model, it behaves similarly to Byzantine servers, with the same assumptions on
message delivery time.
Definition 17 (MaxReplies NCo(t, t+ Tr)k) LetMaxReplies NCo(t, t+ Tr)k be the multi-set main-
tained by client ck containing mij elements, where mij is the i − th message delivered by ck and sent at
time t′, t′ ∈ [t, t+ Tr] by sj such that sj /∈ Co(t
′).
Considering the definitions of both MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr) andMaxCu(t) the next Corollary follows:
Corollary 1 In the worst case scenario, during a read operation lasting Tr ≥ 2δ issued by client ci, ci
delivers MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr) incorrect replies in the (∆S,CAM) model andMaxB˜(t, t+ Tr) +MaxCu(t)
incorrect replies in the (∆S,CUM) model .
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Definition 18 (minReplies Co(t, t+ Tr)k) Let minReplies Co(t, t + Tr)k be the multi-set maintained
by client ck containing mij elements, where mij is the i − th message delivered by ck and sent at time
t′, t′ ∈ [t, t+ Tr] by sj such that sj ∈ Co(t
′).
Note that correct replies come from servers that (i) have never been affected during the time interval
[t, t + Tr], or (ii) where in a cured state at t but do not belong to the Sil(t, t + Tr) set, or (iii) servers that
reply both correctly and incorrectly. The next Corollary follows.
Corollary 2 In the worst case scenario, during a read operation lasting Tr ≥ 2δ issued by client ci, ci
delivers n−(MaxB˜(t, t+Tr)+MaxSil(t, t+Tr))+min ˜CBC(t, t+Tr) correct replies in the (∆S,CAM)
model and n− [MaxB˜(t, t+Tr)+MaxCu(t)]+min ˜CBC(t, t+Tr) correct replies in the (∆S,CUM)
model.
In the following, given a time interval, we characterize correct and incorrect servers involved in such
interval. Concerning correct servers, let us first analyze when a client collects x ≤ n different replies and
then we extend such result to x > n. Then we do the same for incorrect replies.
Lemma 2 Let op be a read operation issued by client ci in a scenario S
∗, whose duration is Tr ≥ 2δ. Let
x, x ≥ 2, be the number of messages delivered by ci during op. If x ≤ n then minReplies Co(t, t+ Tr)k
contains replies from x different servers.
Proof Let us suppose that minReplies Co(t, t+ Tr)k contains replies from x − 1 different servers (triv-
ially it can not be greater than x). Without lost of generality, let us suppose that ci collects replies from
s1, . . . , sx−1. It follows that there is a server si, i ∈ [1, x− 1] that replied twice and a server sx that did not
replied. Let us also suppose w.l.g. that there is one Byzantine mobile agent mak (i.e., f = 1). If during the
time interval [t, t+Tr] sx never replied, then sx has been affected at least during [t+ δ, t+Tr − δ− γ+1].
This implies that Tr ≤ ∆ + 2δ + γ. Since si replies twice then two scenarios are possible during op:
(i) si was first affected by mak and then became correct (so it replied once), then affected again and then
correct again (so it replied twice); (ii) si was correct (so it replied once), then it was affected by mak and
then correct again (so it replied twice). Let us consider case (ii) (case (i) follows trivially). Since si had
the time to reply (δ), to be affected and then became correct (∆ + γ) and reply again (δ) this means that
Tr > ∆+2δ + γ. A similar result we get in case (i) where the considered execution requires a longer time.
This is in contradiction with Tr ≤ ∆+ 2δ + γ thus ci gets replies for x different servers. ✷
If a client delivers n > x messages then we can apply the same reasoning of the previous Lemma to
the first chunk of n messages, then to the second chunk of n messages and so on. Roughly speaking, if
n = 5 and a client delivers 11 messages from correct processes, then there are 3 occurrences of the message
coming from the first server and 2 occurrences of the messages coming from the remaining servers. Thus
the next Corollary directly follows.
Corollary 3 Let op be a read operation issued by client ci in a scenario S
∗, op duration is Tr ≥ 2δ. Let
x, x ≥ 2, be the number of messages delivered by ci during op, then minReplies Co(t, t + Tr)k contains
x mod n messages mij whose occurrences is ⌊
x
n
⌋+ 1 and (n − x (mod n)) messages whose occurrences
is ⌊x
n
⌋.
The case of MaxReplies NCo(t, t + Tr)k directly follows from scenario S
∗, since by hypotheses
mobile Byzantine agents move circularly from servers to servers, never passing on the same server before
having affected all the others. Thus, the following corollary holds.
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Table 2: Lower bounds on the number of replicas in each model.
nCAMLB [2MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr) +MaxSil(t, t+ Tr) −min
˜CBC(t, t+ Tr)]f
nCUMLB [2(MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr) +MaxCu(t, t+ Tr)) −min
˜CBC(t, t+ Tr)]f
Corollary 4 Let op be a read operation issued by client ci in a scenario S
∗, op duration is Tr ≥ 2δ. Let
x, x ≥ 2, be the number of messages delivered by ci during op, thenMaxReplies NCo(t, t+Tr)k contains
x mod n messages mij whose occurrences is ⌊
x
n
⌋+ 1 and (n − x (mod n)) messages whose occurrences
is ⌊x
n
⌋.
At this point we can compute how many correct and incorrect replies a client ck can deliver in the worst
case scenario during a time interval [t, t + Tr]. Trivially, ck in order to distinguish correct and incorrect
replies needs to get minReplies Co(t, t + Tr)k > MaxReplies NCo(t, t + Tr)k. It follows that the
number of correct servers has to be enough to guarantee this condition. Table 2 follows directly from this
observation. In a model with b Byzantine (non mobile) a client ci requires to get at least 2b + 1 replies to
break the symmetry and thus n ≥ 2b+ 1. In presence of mobile Byzantine we have to sum also servers that
do not reply (silent) and do not count twice servers that reply with both incorrect and correct values.
Theorem 1 If n < nCAMLB (n < nCUMLB ) as defined in Table 2, then there not exists a protocol Preg
solving the safe register specification in (∆S,CAM) model ((∆S,CUM) model respectively).
Proof Let us suppose that n < nCAMLB (n < nCUMLB ) and that protocol Preg does exist. If a client
ci invokes a read operation op, lasting Tr ≥ 2δ time, if no write operations occur, then ci returns a valid
value at time tB(op). Let us consider an execution E0 where ci invokes a read operation op and let 0
be the valid value at tB(op). Let us assume that all Byzantine severs involved in such operation reply
once with 1. From Corollaries 1 and 2, ci collects MaxReplies NCo(t, t + Tr)i occurrences of 1 and
minReplies Co(t, t + Tr)i occurrences of 0. Since Preg exists and no write operations occur, then ci
returns 0. Let us now consider a another execution E1 where ci invokes a read operation op and let 1 be
the valid value at tB(op). Let us assume that all Byzantine severs involved in such operation replies once
with 0. From Corollaries 1 and 2 and Corollary 3 and Corollary 4, ci collectsMaxReplies NCo(t, t+Tr)i
occurrences of 0 andminReplies Co(t, t+Tr)i occurrences of 1. Since Preg exists and no write operations
occur, then ci returns 1.
From Lemma 1 and using values in Table 2 we obtain following equations for both models:
• (∆S,CAM):
– MaxReplies NCo(t, t+ Tr)i=MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr) = (⌈
Tr
∆ ⌉+ 1)f
– minReplies Co(t, t+Tr)i= n−[MaxB˜(t, t+Tr)+MaxSil(t, t+Tr)]+min ˜CBC(t, t+Tr) =
[2(MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr)) +MaxSil(t, t+ Tr)
−min ˜CBC(t, t+ Tr)]
−[(MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr) +MaxSil(t, t+ Tr))
+min ˜CBC(t, t+ Tr)] =
MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr) = (⌈
Tr
∆
⌉+ 1)f
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• (∆S,CUM):
– MaxReplies NCo(t, t+ Tr)i=MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr)+MaxCu(t) = (⌈
Tr
∆ ⌉+1)f +MaxCu(t)
– minReplies Co(t, t+ Tr)i= n− [MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr) +MaxCu(t)] +min ˜CBC(t, t+ Tr) =
[2MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr) + 2MaxCu(t))−min ˜CBC(t, t+ Tr)]+
−[MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr) +MaxCu(t)] +min ˜CBC(t, t+ Tr) =
MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr) +MaxCu(t) = (⌈
Tr
∆
⌉+ 1)f +MaxCu(t)
It follows that in E0 and E1 ci delivers the same occurrences of 0 and 1, both executions are indistin-
guishable leading to a contradiction.
✷
MaxReplies NCo(t, t+ Tr)i andminReplies Co(t, t+ Tr)i are equal independently from the value
assumed by Tr, the read() operation duration. From the equation just used in the previous lemma the next
Corollary follows.
Corollary 5 For each Tr ≥ 2δ if n > nCAMLB (n > nCUMLB ) then MaxReplies NCo(t, t + Tr)i <
minReplies Co(t, t+ Tr)i.
At this point we compute minCu(t), MaxSil(t, t + Tr) and min ˜CBC(t, t + Tr) to finally state ex-
act lower bounds depending on the system parameters, in particular depending on ∆, γ and the servers
awareness, i.e., (∆S,CAM) and (∆S,CUM).
Let us adopt the following notation. Given the time interval [t, t+Tr] let {s1, s2, . . . , sb} ∈ B(t, t+Tr)
be the servers affected sequentially during Tr by the mobile agent mak. Let {s−1, s−2, . . . , s−c} ∈ Cu(t)
be the servers in a cured state at time t such that s−1 is the last server that entered in such state and sc the
first server that became cured. Let tBB(si) and tEB(si) be respectively the time instant in which si become
Byzantine and the time in which the Byzantine agent left. tBCu(si) and tECu(si) are respectively the time
instant in which si become cured and the time instant in which it became correct. Considering that mak
moves each ∆ time then we have that tBB(si−1) − tBB(si) = ∆ and tBCu(s−j) − tBCu(s−j+1) = ∆.
The same holds for the tE of such states. Moreover tBB(s1) = tBCu(s−1). Now we are ready to build the
read scenario with respect to S∗. In particular we build a scenario for the (∆S,CAM) model and one for
the (∆S,CUM) model. Intuitively, the presence of cured servers do not have the same impact in the two
models, thus in the (∆S,CUM) model we maximize such number. Let [t, t + 2δ] be the considered time
interval and let ǫ be a positive number arbitrarily smaller, then we consider in the (∆S,CAM) scenarios
t = tEB(s1)− ǫ (cf. Figure 6) and in the (∆S,CUM) scenarios tBB(sb) = t+ 2δ − ǫ (cf. Figure 7).
In the sequel we use the notion of Ramp Function:
R(x) =
{
x if x ≥ 0
0 if x < 0
Lemma 3 Let us consider a time interval [t, t+ Tr], Tr ≥ 2δ and an arbitrarily small number ǫ > 0, then
in fthe (∆S,CAM) modelMaxCu(t) = R(⌈γ−∆+ǫ∆ ⌉).
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s−2=−c
s1
s2
s−1 s3=b
. . .t t+ 2δ
Figure 6: Representation of S∗ when we consider a (∆S,CAM) model, in particular tEB(s1) = t+ ǫ, for
ǫ > 0 and arbitrarily small.
s−2=−c
s1
s2
s−1 s3=b
. . .t t+ 2δ
Figure 7: Representation of S∗ when we consider a (∆S,CUM)model, in particular tBB(sc) = t+2δ−ǫ,
for ǫ > 0 and arbitrarily small.
Proof As we defined, s−1 is the most recent server that entered in a cured state, with respect to the con-
sidered time interval. Intuitively each s−j is in Cu(t) if tECu(s−j) > t. Considering that tECu(s−j) −
tECu(s−j−1) = ∆ then the number of servers in a cured state at t is MaxCu(t) = ⌈
tECu(s1)−t
∆ ⌉.
3 As
we stated, for (∗, CAM) models we consider scenarios in which t, the beginning of the considered time
interval, is just before tEB(s1). Thus given an arbitrarily small number ǫ > 0, let t = tEB(s1) − ǫ. By
construction we know that tBB(s1) = tEB(s1)−∆ = tBCu(s−1). Substituting tBCu(s−1) = t+ ǫ−∆,
since we consider γ the upper bound for the curing time, then tECu(s−1) = t + ǫ − ∆ + γ . So finally,
MaxCu(t) = ⌈ tECu(s1)−t∆ ⌉ = ⌈
γ−∆+ǫ
∆ ⌉ and since there can no be a negative result then MaxCu(t) =
R(⌈γ−∆+ǫ∆ ⌉). This concludes the proof. ✷
Lemma 4 Let us consider a time interval [t, t+ Tr], Tr ≥ 2δ and an arbitrarily small number ǫ > 0, then
in the (∆S,CUM) modelMaxCu(t) = R(⌈
Tr−ǫ−⌈
Tr
∆
⌉∆+γ
∆ ⌉).
Proof As we defined, s−1 is the most recent server that entered in a cured state, with respect to the consid-
ered interval. Intuitively, s−j is inCu(t) if tECu(s−j) > t. Considering that tECu(s−j)−tECu(s−j−1) =
∆ then the number of servers in a cured state at t isMaxCu(t) = ⌈ tECu(s1)−t∆ ⌉. As we state, for (∗, CUM)
models we consider scenarios in which the end of the considered time interval, is just after tBB(sb). Thus
3Consider Figure 6, s2 is the most recent server that entered in the cured state. This is the server that spend more time in such
state with respect to the others. It follows that other servers are in a cured state if during this time interval there is enough time for
a “jump”
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given an arbitrarily small number ǫ > 0, let tBB(sb) = t + Tr − ǫ. By construction we know that
tBB(s1) = tEB(s1)−∆ = tBCu(s−1) and tBB(s1) = tBB(sb)−⌈
Tr
∆ ⌉∆ (cf. Lemma 1). Substituting and
considering that tECu(s−1) = tBCu(s−1)+γ) we get the following: tECu(s−1) = t+Tr− ǫ−⌈
Tr
∆ ⌉+γ.
Finally MaxCu(t) = ⌈ tECu(s1)−t∆ ⌉ = ⌈
Tr−ǫ−⌈
Tr
∆
⌉+γ
∆ ⌉ and since there can not be a negative result then
MaxCu(t) = R(⌈
Tr−ǫ−⌈
Tr
∆
⌉∆+γ
∆ ⌉). This concludes the proof. ✷
Lemma 5 Let us consider a time interval [t, t+ Tr], Tr ≥ 2δ and an arbitrarily small number ǫ > 0, then
in the (∆S,CAM) modelMaxSil(t, t+ Tr) = R(⌈
γ−∆+ǫ−Tr+δ
∆ ⌉).
Proof As we defined, s−1 is the most recent server that entered in a cured state, with respect to the consid-
ered interval. Intuitively, s−j is in Sil(t, t + 2δ) if tECu(s−j) > Tr − δ. Considering that tECu(s−j) −
tECu(s−j−1) = ∆ then the number of servers in a silent state at t isMaxSil(t, t+2δ) = ⌈
tECu(s1)−Tr+δ
∆ ⌉.
As we stated for (∆S,CAM)models we consider scenarios in which t, the beginning of the considered time
interval, is just before tEB(s1). Thus given an arbitrarily small number ǫ > 0, let t = tEB(s1) − ǫ. By
construction we know that tBB(s1) = tEB(s1)−∆ = tBCu(s−1). Substituting tBCu(s−1) = t+ ǫ−∆,
since we consider γ the upper bound for curing time, then tECu(s−1) = t + ǫ − ∆ + γ . So finally,
MaxSil(t, t + Tr) = ⌈
tECu(s1)−Tr+δ
∆ ⌉ = ⌈
γ−∆+ǫ−Tr+δ
∆ ⌉, then since there can not be a negative result
MaxSil(t, t+ 2δ) = R(⌈γ−∆+ǫ−Tr+δ∆ ⌉). ✷
Lemma 6 Let us consider a time interval [t, t+ Tr], Tr ≥ 2δ and an arbitrarily small number ǫ > 0, then
in the (∆S,CUM) modelMaxSil(t, t+ Tr) = ⌈
Tr−ǫ−⌈
Tr
∆
⌉∆+γ−δ
∆ ⌉.
Proof As we defined, s−1 is the most recent server that entered in a cured state, with respect to the consid-
ered interval. Intuitively, s−j is in Sil(t, t + Tr) if tECu(s−j) > Tr − δ. Considering that tECu(s−j) −
tECu(s−j−1) = ∆ then the number of servers in a silent state at t isMaxSil(t, t+Tr) = ⌈
tECu(s1)−Tr+δ
∆ ⌉.
As we stated for (∆S,CUM) models we consider scenarios in which t+Tr, the end of the considered time
interval, is just after tBB(sb). Thus given an arbitrarily small number ǫ > 0, let tBB(sb) = t + Tr − ǫ.
By construction we know that tBB(s1) = tEB(s1)−∆ = tBCu(s−1) and tBB(s1) = tBB(sb)− ⌈
Tr
∆ ⌉∆
(cf. Lemma 1). Substituting and considering that tECu(s−1 = tBCu(s−1) + γ) we get the following:
tECu(s−1 = t+Tr−ǫ−⌈
Tr
∆ ⌉+γ. FinallyMaxSil(t, t+Tr) = ⌈
tECu(s1)−Tr+δ
∆ ⌉ = ⌈
Tr−ǫ−⌈
Tr
∆
⌉+γ−Tr+δ
∆ ⌉,
then since there can not be a negative result,MaxSil(t, t+ Tr) = ⌈
Tr−ǫ−⌈
Tr
∆
⌉∆+γ−Tr+δ
∆ ⌉. ✷
Lemma 7 Let us consider a time interval [t, t+Tr], Tr ≥ 2δ then in the (∆S,CAM) model. min ˜CBC =
R(⌈Tr∆ ⌉ − ⌈
δ
∆⌉) +R(⌈
Tr−γ−Tr+δ
∆ ⌉).
Proof By definition min ˜CBC(t, t+ Tr) = minC˜B(t, t+ Tr) +minB˜C(t, t+ Tr).
- minC˜B(t, t + Tr) is the minimum number of servers that correctly reply and then, before t + Tr are
affected and incorrectly reply. Let us observe that a correct server correctly reply if belongs to Co(t, t+ δ),
it follows that servers in B˜(t, t+ δ) do not correctly reply. Thus,minC˜B(t, t+ Tr) =MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr)−
MaxB˜(t, t+ δ). It may happen thatMaxB˜(t, t+ Tr) < MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr − δ), but obviously there can no
be negative servers, so we consider only non negative values, minC˜B(t, t+ Tr) = R(MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr)−
MaxB˜(t, t+ δ)).
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- minB˜C(t, t + 2δ) is the minimum number of servers that incorrectly reply and then become correct in
time that the correct reply is delivered. A server is able to correctly reply if it is correct before t + Tr − δ
(the reply message needs at most δ time to be delivered). Thus we are interested in servers that are affected
by a mobile agent up to t + Tr − γ − δ. For (∆, CAM) models we consider scenarios in which t, the
beginning of the considered time interval, is just before tEB(s1). Thus given an arbitrarily small number
ǫ > 0, let t = tEB(s1)− ǫ. In the time interval [t, t+ Tr − γ − δ] the number of the mobile agent “jumps”
is given by ⌈Tr−γ−δ∆ ⌉ Trivially, we can not have a negative number, so it becomes R(⌈
Tr−γ−δ
∆ ⌉). Summing
upmin ˜CBC = R(⌈Tr∆ ⌉ − ⌈
δ
∆⌉) +R(⌈
Tr−γ−δ
∆ ⌉), which concludes the proof. ✷
Lemma 8 Let us consider a time interval [t, t + Tr], Tr ≥ 2δ, let ǫ > 0 be an arbitrarily small number.
If maxCu(t) > 0 or γ > ∆ then in the (∆S,CUM) model minC˜B = ⌈Tr−ǫ−δ∆ ⌉ otherwise minC˜B =
R(MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr)−MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr − δ)).
Proof minC˜B(t, t+Tr) is the minimum number of servers that correctly reply and then, before t+Tr are
affected by a mobile agent and incorrectly reply. We are interested in the maximum number of Byzantine
servers in B(t, t + Tr − δ), so that the remaining ones belong to B(t + Tr − δ, t + Tr), which means
that servers in B(t + Tr − δ, t + Tr) are in Co(t, t + δ) (considering the scenario S
∗). Thus, considering
that in the (∆, CUM) model we consider tBB(sb) = t + Tr − ǫ (ǫ > 0 and arbitrarily small) then we
consider the maximum number of “jumps” there could be in the time interval [t + δ, t + Tr − ǫ]. Thus
minC˜B(t, t + Tr) = ⌈
t+Tr−ǫ−t−δ
∆ ⌉ = ⌈
Tr−ǫ−δ
∆ ⌉. If MaxCu(t) = 0 or γ > ∆ then it has no sense to
consider the (∆S,CUM) worst case scenario that aims to maximize cured servers. Thus in this case we
consider the (∆S,CAM) worst case scenario, minC˜B = R(MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr)−MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr − δ)),
concluding the proof. ✷
Lemma 9 Let us consider a time interval [t, t + Tr], Tr ≥ 2δ then in the (∆S,CUM) model then if
maxCu(t) > 0min ˜CBC = ⌈Tr−ǫ−δ∆ ⌉+R(⌈
Tr
∆ ⌉−⌈
γ−δ
∆ ⌉)+(MaxCu(t)−MaxSil(t, t+Tr)), otherwise
min ˜CBC assumes the same values as in the (∆S,CAM) case.
Proof By definition min ˜CBC(t, t + Tr) = minC˜B(t, t + Tr) + minB˜C(t, t + Tr). From Lemma 8,
if maxCu(t) > 0 or ∆ > γ then in the (∆S,CUM) model minC˜B = ⌈Tr−ǫ−δ∆ ⌉ otherwise minC˜B =
R(MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr)−MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr − δ)).
minB˜C(t, t+Tr) is the minimum number of servers that incorrectly reply and then, before t+Tr−δ become
correct so that are able to correctly reply in time such that their reply is delivered. In the (∆S,CUM)
model servers may incorrectly reply because affect by a mobile agent or because in a cured state. In the
first case, a server is able to correctly reply if it become correct before t + Tr − δ (the reply message
needs at most δ time to be delivered). Thus we consider the maximum number of servers that can be
affected in the period t + Tr − γ − δ, t + Tr, which is ⌈
γ+δ
∆ ⌉. Thus, among the Byzantine servers (i.e.,
MaxB˜(t, t + T )) we consider servers not affected in the time interval [t + Tr − γ + δ, t + Tr]. In other
words such servers have γ time to became correct and δ time to reply before the end of the operation.
Thus MaxB˜(t, t + Tr) −Max(t + Tr − γ + δ, t + Tr). Again we can not have a negative number, so it
becomes R(⌈Tr∆ −
γ−δ
∆ ⌉). Concerning servers that incorrectly reply when in a cured state, we are interested
in servers that correctly reply after in time such that the reply is delivered by the client, i.e., they are not
silent. This number is easily computable, MaxCu(t) −MaxSil(t, t + Tr). Thus minB˜C(t, t + 2δ) =
(MaxCu(t)−MaxSil(t, t+Tr)). Summing up ifmaxCu(t) > 0 or∆ > γ, thenmin ˜CBC = ⌈
Tr−ǫ−δ
∆ ⌉+
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Table 3: Values for a general read() operation that terminates after Tr time.
MaxB˜(t, t+ Tr) MaxCu(t) MaxSil(t, t+ Tr)
(∆S,CAM) ⌈Tr∆ ⌉+ 1 R(⌈
γ−∆+ǫ
∆ ⌉) R(⌈
γ−∆+ǫ−Tr+δ
∆ ⌉)
(∆S,CUM) ⌈Tr∆ ⌉+ 1 R(⌈
Tr−ǫ−⌈
Tr
∆
⌉∆+γ
∆ ⌉) ⌈
γ+δ−ǫ−⌈Tr
∆
⌉∆
∆ ⌉
min ˜CBC(t, t+ Tr)
(∆S,CAM) R(⌈Tr∆ ⌉ − ⌈
δ
∆⌉) +R(⌈
Tr−γ−δ
∆ ⌉)
(∆S,CUM) ⌈Tr−ǫ−δ∆ ⌉
a+R(⌈Tr∆ ⌉ − ⌈
γ+δ
∆ ⌉) + (MaxCu(t)−MaxSil(t, t+ Tr))
aifmaxCu(t) > 0 otherwise is the same value ofmin ˜CBC(t, t+ Tr) in the (∗, CAM) model
R(⌈Tr∆ ⌉ − ⌈
γ−δ
∆ ⌉) + (MaxCu(t)−MaxSil(t, t+ 2δ)), otherwise min
˜CBC assumes the same values as
in the (∆S,CAM) model, which concludes the proof. ✷
In Table 3 are reported all the results found so far for (∆S, ∗) models.
Such results have been proved considering f = 1. Extending such results to scenario for f > 1 is
straightforward in the (∆S, ∗) model. The extension to f > 1 in the (ITB, ∗) and (ITU, ∗) models is less
direct. What is left to prove is that the results found for f = 1 can be applied to all other models in which
mobile agents move independently from each other. In the following Lemma we employ ∗ to indicate that
the result holds for ∗ assuming consistently the value CAM or CUM .
Lemma 10 Let n∗LB ≤ α∗(∆, δ, γ)f be the impossibility results holding in the (∆S, ∗) model for f = 1.
If there exists a tight protocol Preg solving the safe register for n ≥ α∗(∆, δ, γ)f + 1 (f ≥ 1) then all the
Safe Register impossibility results that hold in the (∆S, ∗) models hold also in the (ITB, ∗) and (ITU, ∗)
models.
Proof Let us consider the scenario S∗ for f = 1 and a read() operation time interval [t, t + Tr], t ≥
0. Depending on the value of t there can be different (but finite) read scenarios, rs1, rs2, . . . , rss. By
hypothesis there exists Preg solving the safe register for n ≥ α∗f(∆, δ, γ)+1 then among the read scenarios
RS = {rs1, rs2, . . . , rss} all the possible worst case scenarios {wrs1, . . . , wrsw} ⊆ RS hold for n =
α∗(∆, δ, γ)f (meaning that Preg does not exist). We can say that those worst scenarios are equivalent in
terms of replicas, i.e., for each wsrk is it possible to build an impossibility run if n = α∗(∆, δ, γ) but Preg
works if n = α∗(∆, δ, γ) + 1 (if we consider f = 1). Let us now consider (∆S, ∗) for f > 1. In this case,
mobile agents move all together, thus the samewrsk scenario is reproduced f times. For each wrsk scenario
is it possible to build an impossibility run if n = α∗(∆, δ, γ)f , i.e., α∗(∆, δ, γ) − 1 non Byzantine servers
are not enough to cope with 1 Byzantine server, then it is straightforward that α∗(∆, δ, γ)−f non Byzantine
servers are not enough to cope with f Byzantine servers, the same scenario is reproduced f times.
In the case of unsynchronized movements (ITB and ITU) we consider ∆ = min {∆1, . . . ,∆f}. Each
mobile agent generates a different read scenarios, those scenario can be up to f . As we just stated, if Preg
exists, those worst case scenarios are equivalent each others in terms of replicas. Since all the worst case
scenarios are equivalent in terms of replicas, thus impossibility results holding for mobile agents moving
together hold also for mobile agent moving in an uncoordinated way. ✷
In [8], for n ≥ α∗(∆, δ, γ)f + 1 (f ≥ 1), it has been presented a tight protocol Preg that solves the
Regular Register problem whose bounds match the safe register lower bounds. Thus the next corollary
follows.
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Table 4: Parameters for PReg Protocol in the (ITB,CAM) and (ITB,CUM) models, minimum number
of replicas, and minimum expected occurrence of correct values.
(CAM, ITB)
2δ ≤ ∆<3δ
nCAM 4f+1
#replyCAM 2f+1
δ ≤ ∆<2δ
nCAM 6f+1
#replyCAM 3f+1
(CUM, ITB)
2δ ≤ ∆<3δ
nCUM 7f+1
#replyCUM 4f+1
δ ≤ ∆<2δ
nCUM 12f+1
#replyCUM 7f+1
Corollary 6 Let n∗LB ≤ α∗(∆, δ, γ)f be the impossibility results holding in the (∆S, ∗) model for f = 1.
All the Safe Register impossibility results hold also in the (ITB, ∗) and (ITU, ∗) models.
4 Upper Bounds
In this section, we present an overview of the optimal protocols that implement a SWMR Regular Register
in a round-free synchronous system respectively for (ITB,CAM) and (ITB,CUM) instances of the
proposed MBF model.
Following the same approach we used in [8] for the (∆S,CAM) model, our solution is based on the
following two key points: (1) we implement a maintenance() operation, in this case executed on demand;
(2) we implement read() and write() operations following the classical quorum-based approach. The size
of the quorum needed to carry on the operations, and consequently the total number of servers required by
the computation, is dependent on the time to terminate the maintenance() operation, δ and ∆ (see Table 4).
The difference with respect (∆S,CAM) model is that the time at which mobile agents move is unknown.
Notice that each mobile mai agent has it own ∆i. Since we do not have any other information we consider
∆ = min{∆1, . . . ,∆f}.
The maintenance() operation for (ITB,CAM) model. This operation is executed by servers on demand
(request-reply) when the oracle notifies them that are in a cured state. Notice that in the (∗, CAM) models
servers know when a mobile agent leaves them, thus depending on such knowledge they execute different
actions. In particular, if a server si is not in a cured state then it does nothing, it just replies to ECHO REQ()
messages. Otherwise, if a server si is in a cured state it first cleans its local variables and broadcast to
other servers a request. Then, after 2δ time units it removes values that may come from servers that were
Byzantine before the maintenance() and updates its state by checking the number of occurrences of each
value received from the other servers. Contrarily to the (∆S,CAM) case, a cured server notifies to all
servers that it was Byzantine in the previous δ time period. This is done invoking the awareAll function that
broadcasts a default value ⊥ after δ time a server discovered to be in a cured state. This is done to prevent
a cured server to collect “slow” replies coming from servers that were affected before the execution of the
maintenance() operation. In this model, the curing time γ ≤ 2δ.
The maintenance() operation for (ITB,CUM) model. In this case servers are not aware of their failure
state, thus they have to run such operation even if they are correct or cured. In addition, in the (ITB,CUM)
model, the moment at which mobile agents move is not known, thus as for the (ITB,CAM) case, a request-
reply pattern is used to implement themaintenance() operation. Such operation is executed by servers every
2δ times. In this case, to prevent a cured server to collect “slow” replies coming from servers that were af-
fected before the execution of the maintenance() operation, a server choses a random number to associate
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Table 5: Parameters for PRreg Protocol for the (ITB,CUM) model.
k = ⌈ 2δ
∆
⌉ ≥ 1 nCUM ≥ (5k + 2)f + 1 #replyCUM ≥ (3k + 1)f + 1 #echoCUM ≥ (3k) + 1f
k = 2 12f + 1 7f + 1 6f + 1
k = 1 7f + 1 4f + 1 4f + 1
to such particular maintenance() operation instance 4, broadcast the ECHO REQ() message and waits 2δ be-
fore restart ing the operation. When there is a value whose occurrence overcomes the#echoCUM threshold,
such value is stored at the server side.
Notice that, contrarily to all the previous models, servers are not aware of their failure state and do not
synchronize the maintenance() operation with each other. The first consequence is that a mobile agent may
leave a cured server running such operation with garbage in server variables, making the operation unfruit-
ful. Such server has to wait 2δ to run again the maintenance() operation with clean variables, so that next
time it will be effective, which implies γ ≤ 4δ.
The write operation. To write a new value v, the writer increments its sequence number csn and propa-
gates v and csn to all servers via a WRITE messages. Then, it waits for δ time units (the maximum message
transfer delay) before returning. When a server si delivers a WRITE, it updates its local variables and sends
a REPLY message to all clients that are currently reading to allow them to complete their read operation.
The read operation. When a client wants to read, it broadcasts a READ request to all servers and then waits
2δ time (i.e., one round trip delay) to collect replies. When it is unblocked from the wait statement, it selects
a value v occurring enough number of times (see #replyC∗M from Table 4) from the replies set, sends an
acknowledgement message to servers to inform that its operation is now terminated and returns v as result
of the operation. When a server si delivers a READ(j) message from client cj , it first puts its identifier in
the pending read set to remember that cj is reading and needs to receive possible concurrent updates and it
sends a reply back to cj .
4.1 Preg in the (ITB,CAM)model
The protocol Preg for the (ITB,CAM)model is described in Figures 8 - 10, which present themaintenance(),
write(), and read() operations, respectively.
Local variables at client ci. Each client ci maintains a set replyi that is used during the read() operation to
collect the three tuples 〈j, 〈v, sn〉〉 sent back from servers. In particular v is the value, sn is the associated
sequence number and j is the identifier of server sj that sent the reply back. Additionally, ci also maintains
a local sequence number csn that is incremented each time it invokes a write() operation and is used to
timestamp such operations monotonically.
Local variables at server si. Each server si maintains the following local variables (we assume these
variables are initialized to zero, false or empty sets according their type):
• Vi: an ordered set containing d tuples 〈v, sn〉, where v is a value and sn the corresponding se-
quence number. Such tuples are ordered incrementally according to their sn values. The function
4Is it out of the scope of this work to describe such function, we assume that Byzantine server can not predict the random number
chosen next.
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insert(Vi, 〈vk, snk〉) places the new value in Vi according to the incremental order and, if there are
more than d values, it discards from Vi the value associated to the lowest sn.
• pending readi: set variable used to collect identifiers of the clients that are currently reading.
• curedi: boolean flag updated by the cured state oracle. In particular, such variable is set to truewhen
si becomes aware of its cured state and it is reset during the algorithm when si becomes correct.
• echo valsi and echo readi: two sets used to collect information propagated through ECHO messages.
The first one stores tuple 〈j, 〈v, sn〉〉 propagated by servers just after the mobile Byzantine agents
moved, while the second stores the set of concurrently reading clients in order to notify cured servers
and expedite termination of read().
• curingi: set used to collect servers running the maintenance() operation. Notice, to keep the code
simple we do not explicitly manage how to empty such set since has not impact on safety properties.
In order to simplify the code of the algorithm, let us define the following functions:
• select d pairs max sn(echo valsi): this function takes as input the set echo valsi and returns, if they
exist, three tuples 〈v, sn〉, such that there exist at least #echoCAM occurrences in echo valsi of such
tuple. If more than three of such tuple exist, the function returns the tuples with the highest sequence
numbers.
• select value(replyi): this function takes as input the replyi set of replies collected by client ci and
returns the pair 〈v, sn〉 occurring at least #replyCAM times (see Table ??). If there are more pairs
satisfying such condition, it returns the one with the highest sequence number.
• delete cured values(echo vals): this function takes as input echo valsi and removes from fw valsi
all values coming from servers that sent an ECHO() message containing ⊥.
The maintenance() operation. Such operation is executed by servers on demand when the oracle notifies
them that are in a cured state. Notice that in the (∗, CAM) models servers knows when a mobile agent
leaves them, thus depending on such knowledge they execute different actions. In particular, if a server si is
not in a cured state then it does nothing, it just replies to ECHO REQ() messages. Otherwise, if a server si is
in a cured state it first cleans its local variables and broadcast to other servers an echo request then, after 2δ
time units it removes value that may come from servers that were Byzantine before the maintenance() and
updates its state by checking the number of occurrences of each pair 〈v, sn〉 received with ECHO messages.
In particular, it updates Vi invoking the select three pairs max sn(echo valsi) function that populates Vi
with d tuples 〈v, sn〉. At the end it assigns false to curedi variable, meaning that it is now correct and the
echo valsi can now be emptied. Contrarily to the (∆S,CAM) case, cured server notifies to all that it has
been Byzantine in the previous δ time period. This is done invoking the awareAll function that broadcast a
default value ⊥ after δ time that a server discovered to be in a cured state.
The write() operation. When the writer wants to write a value v, it increments its sequence number csn
and propagates v and csn to all servers. Then it waits for δ time units (the maximum message transfer delay)
before returning.
When a server si delivers a WRITE, it updates its local variables and sends a REPLY() message to all
clients that are currently reading (clients in pending readi) to notify them about the concurrent write()
operation and to each server executing the maintenance() operation (servers in curingi).
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function awareAll():
(01) broadcast ECHO(i,⊥)
(02) wait(δ);
(03) broadcast ECHO(i,⊥)
——————————————————————————————————
operation maintenance() executed while (TRUE) :
(04) curedi ← report cured state();
(05) if (curedi) then
(06) curedi ← false;
(07) curing statei ← true;
(08) Vi ← ∅; echo valsi ← ∅; pending readi ← ∅;curingi ← ∅;
(09) broadcast ECHO REQ(i);
(10) awareAll();
(11) wait(2δ);
(12) delete cured values(echo vals);
(13) insert(Vi, select three pairs max sn(echo valsi));
(14) for each (j ∈ (curingi)) do
(15) send ECHO (i, Vi) to sj ;
(16) endFor
(17) curing statei ← false;
(18) endIf
——————————————————————————————————
when ECHO (j, Vj) is received:
(19) for each (〈v, sn〉 ∈ Vj do
(20) echo valsi ← echo valsi ∪ 〈v, sn〉j ;
(21) endFor
——————————————————————————————————
when ECHO REQ (j) is received:
(22) curingi ← curingi ∪ j;
(23) if (Vi 6= ∅)
(24) send ECHO(i, Vi);
(25) endif
Figure 8: AM algorithm implementing the maintenance() operation (code for server si) in the
(ITB,CAM) model.
The read() operation. When a client wants to read, it broadcasts a READ() request to all servers and waits
2δ time (i.e., one round trip delay) to collect replies. When it is unblocked from the wait statement, it selects
a value v invoking the select value function on replyi set, sends an acknowledgement message to servers to
inform that its operation is now terminated and returns v as result of the operation.
When a server si delivers a READ(j)message from client cj it first puts its identifier in the set pending readi
to remember that cj is reading and needs to receive possible concurrent updates, then si checks if it is in a
cured state and if not, it sends a reply back to cj . Note that, the REPLY() message carries the set Vi.
When a READ ACK(j) message is delivered, cj identifier is removed from both pending readi set as it
does not need anymore to receive updates for the current read() operation.
4.2 Preg in the (ITB,CUM)model
Preg Detailed Description The protocol Preg for the (ITB,CUM) model is described in Figures 11 - 13,
which present the maintenance(), write(), and read() operations, respectively. Table 5 reports the parame-
ters for the protocol. In particular nCUM is the bound on the number of servers, #replyCUM is minimum
number of occurrences from different servers of a value to be accepted as a reply during a read() operation
and #echoCUM is the minimum number of occurrences from different servers of a value to be accepted
during the maintenance() operation.
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========= Client code ==========
operation write(v):
(01) csn← csn+ 1;
(02) broadcast WRITE(v, csn);
(03) wait (δ);
(04) return write confirmation;
========= Server code ==========
when WRITE(v, csn) is received:
(05) insert(Vi, 〈v, csn〉);
(06) for each j ∈ (pending readi) do
(07) send REPLY (i, {〈v, csn〉});
(08) endFor
(09) for each j ∈ (curingi) do
(10) send ECHO (i, Vi);
(11) endFor
Figure 9: AW algorithm implementing the write(v) operation in the (ITB,CAM) model.
========= Client code ==========
operation read():
(01) replyi ← ∅;
(02) broadcast READ(i);
(03) wait (2δ);
(04) 〈v, sn〉 ← select value(replyi);
(05) broadcast READ ACK(i);
(06) return v;
———————————————————————–
when REPLY (j, Vj) is received:
(07) for each (〈v, sn〉 ∈ Vj) do
(08) replyi ← replyi ∪ {〈j, 〈v, sn〉〉};
(09) endFor
========= Server code ==========
when READ (j) is received:
(10) pending readi ← pending readi ∪ {j};
(11) if (Vi 6= ∅)
(12) then send REPLY (i, Vi);
(13) endif
———————————————————————–
when READ ACK (j) is received:
(14) pending readi ← pending readi \ {j};
Figure 10: AR algorithm implementing the read() operation in the (ITB,CAM) model.
Local variables at client ci. Each client ci maintains a set replyi that is used during the read() operation to
collect the three tuples 〈j, 〈v, sn〉〉 sent back from servers. In particular v is the value, sn is the associated
sequence number and j is the identifier of server sj that sent the reply back. Additionally, ci also maintains
a local sequence number csn that is incremented each time it invokes a write() operation and is used to
timestamp such operations monotonically.
Local variables at server si. Each server si maintains the following local variables (we assume these
variables are initialized to zero, false or empty sets according their type):
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• Vi: an ordered set containing 3 tuples 〈v, sn〉, where v is a value and sn the corresponding sequence
number. Such tuples are ordered incrementally according to their sn values.
• Vsafej : this set has the same characteristic as Vj . The insert(Vsafei , 〈vk, snk〉) function places the
new value in Vsafei according to the incremental order and if dimensions exceed 3 then it discards
from Vsafei the value associated to the lowest sn.
• Wi: is the set where servers store values coming directly from the writer, associating to it a timer,
〈v, sn, timer〉. Values from this set are deleted when the timer expires or has a value non compliant
with the protocol.
• pending readi: set variable used to collect identifiers of the clients that are currently reading.
• echo valsi and echo readi: two sets used to collect information propagated through ECHO messages.
The first one stores tuple 〈j, 〈v, sn〉〉 propagated by servers just after the mobile Byzantine agents
moved, while the second stores the set of concurrently reading clients in order to notify cured servers
and expedite termination of read().
• curingi: set used to collect servers running the maintenance() operation. Notice, to keep the code
simple we do not explicitly manage how to empty such set since has not impact on safety properties.
In order to simplify the code of the algorithm, let us define the following functions:
• select three pairs max sn(echo valsi): this function takes as input the set echo valsi and returns, if
they exist, three tuples 〈v, sn〉, such that there exist at least #echoCUM occurrences in echo valsi
of such tuple. If more than three of such tuples exist, the function returns the tuples with the highest
sequence numbers.
• select value(replyi): this function takes as input the replyi set of replies collected by client ci and
returns the pair 〈v, sn〉 occurring occurring at least #replyCUM times. If there are more pairs with
the same occurrence, it returns the one with the highest sequence number.
• conCut(Vi, Vsafei ,Wi): this function takes as input three 3 dimension ordered sets and returns another
3 dimension ordered set. The returned set is composed by the concatenation of Vsafei ◦ Vi ◦ Wi,
without duplicates, truncated after the first 3 newest values (with respect to the timestamp). e.g.,
Vi = {〈va, 1〉, 〈vb, 2〉, 〈vc, 3〉, 〈vd, 4〉} and Vsafei = {〈vb, 2〉, 〈vd, 4〉, 〈vf , 5〉} and Wi = ∅, then the
returned set is {〈vc, 3〉, 〈vd, 4〉, 〈vf , 5〉}.
The maintenance() operation. Such operation is executed by servers every 2δ times. Each time si resets
its variables, except forWi (that is continuously checked by the function timerCheck()) and the content of
Vsafei , which overrides the content of Vi, before to be reset. Then si choses a random number to associate
to such particular maintenance() operation instance 5, broadcast the ECHO REQ() message and waits 2δ
before to restart the operation. In the meantime ECHO() messages are delivered and stored in the echo valsi
set. When there is value v whose occurrence overcomes the #echoCUM threshold, such value is stored in
Vsafei and a REPLY() message with v is sent to current reader clients (if any).
5Is it out of the scope of this work to describe such function, we assume that Byzantine server can not predict the random
number chosen next. The aim of such number is to prevent Byzantine servers to send reply to maintenance() operations before
their invocation, or, in other words, it prevents correct servers to accept those replies.
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operation timerCheck(Wi) executed while (TRUE) :
(01) for each (〈〈v, csn〉, timer〉j ∈ Wi) do
(02) if (Expires(timer) ∧ (timer > 4δ))
(03) Wi ←Wi \ 〈〈v, csn〉, timer〉j ;
(04) endif
(05) endFor
————————————————————————————————————-
operation maintenance() executed while (TRUE) :
(06) echo valsi ← ∅; Vi ← Vsafei ; Vsafe ← ∅;
(07) rand← new rand();
(08) broadcast ECHO REQ(i, rand);
(09) wait(2δ);
——————————————————————————————————
when select three pairs max sn(echo valsi) 6= ⊥
(10) insert(Vsafei , select three pairs max sn(echo valsi));
(11) for each (j ∈ (pending readi ∪ echo readi)) do
(12) send REPLY (i, Vsafe) to cj ;
(13) endFor
————————————————————————————————————-
when ECHO (j, S, pr, r) is received:
(14) if (rand = r)then:
(15) echo valsi ← echo valsi ∪ 〈v, sn〉j ;
(16) echo readi ← echo readi ∪ pr;
(17) endIf
——————————————————————————————————
when ECHO REQ (j, r) is received:
(18) Seti ← ∅;
(19) for each〈〈v, csn〉, epoch〉j ∈ Wi do;
(20) Seti ← Seti ∪ 〈v, csn〉j ;
(21) endFor
(22) send ECHO(i, Vi ∪ Seti, r) to sj ;
Figure 11: AM algorithm implementing the maintenance() operation (code for server si) in the
(ITB,CUM) model.
Notice that, contrarily to all the previous models, servers are not aware about their failure state and do not
synchronize the maintenance() operation with each other. The first consequence is a that a mobile agent
may leave a cured server running such operation with garbage in server variables, making the operation
unfruitful. Such server has to wait 2δ to run again the maintenance() operation with clean variables, so that
next time it will be effective, which implies γ ≤ 4δ.
The write() operation. When the writer wants to write a value v, it increments its sequence number csn
and propagates v and csn to all servers. Then it waits for δ time units (the maximum message transfer delay)
before returning.
When a server si delivers a WRITE message, it updates Wi, associating to such value a timer 4δ. 4δ it is
a consequence of the double maintenance() operation that a cured server has to run in order to be sure to be
correct. Thus if a server is correct it keeps v inWi during 4δ, which is enough for our purposes. On the other
side a cured servers keeps a value (not necessarily coming from a write() operation) no more than the time
it is in a cured state, 4δ, which is safe. After storing v in Wi, such value is inserted in REPLY() message to
all clients that are currently reading (clients in pending readi) to notify them about the concurrent write()
operation and to any server executing the maintenance() operation (servers in curingi).
The read() operation. When a client wants to read, it broadcasts a READ() request to all servers and waits
2δ time (i.e., one round trip delay) to collect replies. When it is unblocked from the wait statement, it selects
a value v invoking the select value function on replyi set, sends an acknowledgement message to servers to
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========= Client code ==========
operation write(v):
(01) csn← csn+ 1;
(02) broadcast WRITE(v, csn);
(03) wait (δ);
(04) return write confirmation;
========= Server code ==========
when WRITE(v, csn) is received:
(05) Wi ←Wi ∪ 〈〈v, csn〉, setTimer(4δ)}〉;
(06) for each j ∈ (pending readi ∪ echo readi) do
(07) send REPLY (i, {〈v, csn〉});
(08) endFor
(09) broadcast ECHO(i, 〈v, csn〉);
Figure 12: AW algorithm implementing the write(v) operation in the (ITB,CUM) model.
inform that its operation is now terminated and returns v as result of the operation.
When a server si delivers a READ(j)message from client cj it first puts its identifier in the set pending readi
to remember that cj is reading and needs to receive possible concurrent updates, then si sends a reply back
to cj . Note that, in the REPLY() message is carried the result of conCut(Vi, Vsafei ,Wi). In this case, if
the server is correct then Vi contains valid values, and Vsafei contains valid values by construction, since it
comes from values sent during the current maintenance(). If the server is cured, then Vi andWi may contain
any value. Finally, si forwards a READ FW message to inform other servers about cj read request. This is
useful in case some server missed the READ(j) message as it was affected by mobile Byzantine agent when
such message has been delivered.
When a READ ACK(j) message is delivered, cj identifier is removed from both pending readi set as it
does not need anymore to receive updates for the current read() operation.
5 Correctness
5.1 Correctness (ITB,CAM)
To prove the correctness of Preg, we first show that the termination property is satisfied i.e, that read() and
write() operations terminates.
Lemma 11 If a correct client ci invokes write(v) operation at time t then this operation terminates at time
t+ δ.
Proof The claim follows by considering that a write confirmation event is returned to the writer client ci
after δ time, independently of the behavior of the servers (see lines 03-04, Figure 9). ✷
Lemma 12 If a correct client ci invokes read() operation at time t then this operation terminates at time
t+ 2δ.
Proof The claim follows by considering that a read() returns a value to the client after 2δ time, indepen-
dently of the behavior of the servers (see lines 03-06, Figure 10). ✷
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========= Client code ==========
operation read():
(01) replyi ← ∅;
(02) broadcast READ(i);
(03) wait (2δ);
(04) 〈v, sn〉 ← select value(replyi);
(05) broadcast READ ACK(i);
(06) return v;
———————————————————————–
when REPLY (j, Vj) is received:
(07) for each (〈v, sn〉 ∈ Vj) do
(08) replyi ← replyi ∪ {〈j, 〈v, sn〉〉};
(09) endFor
========= Server code ==========
when READ (j) is received:
(10) pending readi ← pending readi ∪ {j};
(11) send REPLY (i, conCut(Vi, Vsafei ,Wi));
(12) broadcast READ FW(j);
———————————————————————–
when READ FW (j) is received:
(13) pending readi ← pending readi ∪ {j};
———————————————————————–
when READ ACK (j) is received:
(14) pending readi ← pending readi \ {j};
(15) echo readi ← echo readi \ {j};
Figure 13: AR algorithm implementing the read() operation in the (ITB,CUM) model.
Theorem 2 (Termination) If a correct client ci invokes an operation, ci returns from that operation in finite
time.
Proof The proof follows from Lemma 11 and Lemma 12. ✷
Validity property is proved with the following steps:
• 1. maintenance() operation works (i.e., at the end of the operation n−f servers store valid values). In
particular, for a given value v stored by #echo correct servers at the beginning of the maintenance()
operation, there are n− f servers that may store v at the end of the operation;
• 2. given a write() operation that writes v at time t and terminates at time t+δ, there is a time t′ > t+δ
after which#reply correct servers store v.
• 3. at the next maintenance() operation after t′ there are #reply − f = #echo correct servers that
store v, for step (1) this value is maintained.
• 4. the validity follows considering that the read() operation is long enough to include the t′ of the last
written value before the read() and V is big enough to do not be full filled with new values before t′.
Before to prove the correctness of the maintenance() operation let us see how many Byzantine agent
there may be during such operation. Since the cured server run it as soon as the mobile agent mai leaves
it, then mai movement are aligned to such operation, this agent contribution is
2δ
∆ = k. All the others
f − 1 mobile agent are not aligned, thus their contribution is MaxB˜(t, t + 2δ) = k + 1. Thus there are
k + (k + 1)× (f − 1) Byzantine servers during the 2δ time maintenance() operation.
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Lemma 13 (Step 1) Let Ti = t be the time at which mobile agent mai leave sc. Let v be the value stored
at #echoCAM servers sj /∈ B(t, t + δ) ∧ sj ∈ Co(t+ δ), v ∈ Vj∀sj ∈ Co(t+ δ). At time t+ 2δ, at the
end of the maintenance(), v is returned to sc by the function select d pairs max sn(echo valsc).
Proof The proof follows considering that:
• the maintenance() employs a request-reply pattern and during such operation, by hypothesis, there
are #echoCAM servers that are never affected during the [Ti, Ti + δ] time period and are correct at
time Ti+δ. i.e., there are#echoCAM servers that deliver the ECHO REQ() message (the can be either
correct or cured) but are correct at time Ti + δ such that the reply is delivered by sc by time Ti + 2δ.
• during the maintenance() operation there are k + (k + 1) × (f − 1) Byzantine servers, and (k2 )f
servers that were Byzantine in [t− δ, t] time period, thus they could have sent incorrect messages as
well.
• each cured servers, invokes AWAREALL() function, sends a ⊥message twice: when they are aware to
be cured and δ time after. Thus by time t+2δ server running the maintenance removes from echo vals
the (k2 )f messages sent by those servers. In the end there are k + (k + 1)× (f − 1) = (k + 1)f − 1
messages coming from Byzantine servers in the echo valsc set.
#echoCAM = (k+1)f > (k+1)f−1 thus Byzantine servers can not force the select d pairs max sn(echo valsc)
function to return a not valid value and select d pairs max sn(echo valsc) returns v that occurs#replyCAM
times, concluding the proof. ✷
Lemma 14 (Step 2.) Let opW be a write(v) operation invoked by a client ck at time tB(opW ) = t then at
time t+ δ there are at least #replyCAM servers sj /∈ B(t+ δ) such that v ∈ Vj .
Proof The proof follows considering that during the write() operation, [t, t+δ], there can be at most (k2+1)f
mobile agents. Thus, during such time there are n−(k2+1)f = 2(k+1)f+1−(
k
2+1)f = (k+
k
2+1)f+1
servers sj that being either cured or correct, execute code in Figure 9, line 05, inserting v in Vj . Finally,
(k + k2 + 1)f + 1 > (k + 1)f + 1 = #replyCAM concluding the proof.
✷
For simplicity, for now on, given a write() operation opW we call tB(opW ) + δ = twC the completion
time of opW , the time at which there are at least #replyCAM servers storing the value written by opW .
Lemma 15 (Step 3.) Let opW be a write() operation occurring at tB(opW ) = t and let v be the written
value and let twC be its completion time. Then if there are no other write() operations after opW , the value
written by opW is stored by all correct servers forever.
Proof Following the same reasoning as Lemma 14, at time t+δ, assuming that in [t, t+δ] there are (k2+1)f ,
then there are at least (k + k2 + 1)f + 1 servers sj that being either cured or correct, execute code in Figure
9, line 05, inserting v in Vj . Now let us consider the following:
• Let B1 = B˜(t, t + δ) be the set containing the (
k
2 + 1)f Byzantine servers during [t, t + δ], so that
there are (2k + 1)f + 1− k2 = (k +
k
2 + 1)f + 1 ≥ #replyCUM non faulty servers storing v;
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– there are (k2 )f Byzantine servers in B1 that begin the maintenance() operation . At that time
there are #replyCAM non faulty servers storing v, being #replyCAM > #echoCAM , for
Lemma 13 at the end of the maintenance() operation, by time t + 3δ, those servers obtain v
a result of select d pairs max sn(echo vals) invocation, whose is stored in V since there are no
other write() operation and since v has the highest associated sequence number.
• Let B2 = B˜(t+ δ, t+2δ) be the set containing Byzantine servers in the next δ period. Those servers
are k2f (it is not
k
2f + 1, otherwise we would count the Byzantine servers at t + δ twice). Thus, at
t+2δ there are (k+ k2 +1)f +1−
k
2f = (k+1)f +1 = #replyCAM non faulty servers storing v;
– there are (k2 )f Byzantine servers in B2 that begin themaintenance() operation during [t+ δ, t+
2δ] time interval. There are #replyCAM non faulty servers storing v, being #replyCAM >
#echoCAM , for Lemma 13 at the end of the maintenance() operation, by time t + 4δ, those
servers, get v invoking select d pairs max sn(echo vals), whose is stored in V since there are
no other write() operation and since v has the highest associated sequence number.
• Let B3 = B˜(t+2δ, t+3δ) be the set containing Byzantine servers in the next δ period. Those servers
are k2f . At t + 3δ there are (k + 1)f + 1 −
k
2f < #replyCAM non faulty servers storing v and
the there are (k2 )f servers in B1 that terminated the maintenance() operation storing v. Summing up
there are (k + 1)f + 1− k2f +
k
2f = #replyCAM servers storing v.
Thus, after t + 3δ period there are servers becoming affected that lose v, but there are other f servers that
become correct storing v, so that all correct servers store v. Since there are no more write() operation, this
reasoning can be extended forever, concluding the proof. ✷
Lemma 16 (Step 3.) Let opW0 , opW1 , . . . , opWk−1 , opWk , opWk+1 , . . . be the sequence of write() opera-
tions issued on the regular register. Let us consider a particular opWk , let v be the value written by opWk
and let tEwk be its completion time. Then the register stores v (there are at least #replyCAM correct
servers storing it) up to time at least tBWk+3.
Proof The proof simply follows considering that:
• for Lemma 15 if there are no more write() operation then v, after twC , is in the register forever.
• any new written value is store in an ordered set V (cf. Figure 9 line 05) whose dimension is 3.
• write() operations occur sequentially.
It follows that after the beginning of 3 write() operations, opWk+1, opWk+2 , opWk+3 , v it may be no more
stored in the regular register. ✷
Theorem 3 (Step 4.) Any read() operation returns the last value written before its invocation, or a value
written by a write() operation concurrent with it.
Proof Let us consider a read() operation opR. We are interested in the time interval [tB(opR), tB(opR)+δ].
Since such operation lasts 2δ, the reply messages sent by correct servers within tB(opR) + δ are delivered
by the reading client. For δ ≤ ∆ < 3δ during [t, t + δ] time interval there are n − k2 − 1 ≥ #replyCAM
correct servers that have the time to deliver the read request and reply. Now we have to prove that what
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those correct servers reply with is a valid value. There are two cases, opR is concurrent with some write()
operations or not.
- opR is not concurrent with any write() operation. Let opW be the last write() operation such that
tE(opW ) ≤ tB(opR) and let v be the last written value. For Lemma 15 after the write completion time tCw
there are #replyCAM non faulty servers storing v. Since tB(opR) + δ ≥ tCw, then there are #replyCAM
non faulty servers replying with v (Figure 10, lines 11-12). So the last written value is returned.
- opR is concurrent with some write() operation. Let us consider the time interval [tB(opR), tB(opR)+δ].
In such time there can be at most two write() operations. Thus for Lemma 16 the last written value before
tB(opR) is still present in #replyCAM non faulty servers. Thus at least the last written value is returned.
To conclude, for Lemma 1, during the read() operation there are at most (k + 1)f Byzantine servers, being
#replyCAM > (k+1)f then Byzantine servers may not force the reader to read another or older value and
even if an older values has #replyCAM occurrences the one with the highest sequence number is chosen.
✷
Theorem 4 Let n be the number of servers emulating the register and let f be the number of Byzantine
agents in the (ITB,CAM) round-free Mobile Byzantine Failure model. Let δ be the upper bound on
the communication latencies in the synchronous system. If n = nCAM according to Table ?? then Preg
implements a SWMR Regular Register in the (ITB,CAM) and (ITU,CAM) round-free Mobile Byzantine
Failure model.
Proof The proof simply follows from Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 and considering ∆ = 1 in the case of
(ITU,CAM) model. ✷
Lemma 17 Protocol Preg for δ ≤ ∆ < 3δ is tight with respect to γ ≤ 2δ.
Proof The proof follows from Theorem 4 and Theorem 1, i.e., upper bound and lower bound match. In
particular Lower bounds are computed using the values in Table 3 to compute nCAMLB as defined in Table
2 for γ ≤ 2δ (cf. Lemma 13). ✷
5.2 Correctness (ITB,CUM)
To prove the correctness of Preg we demonstrate that the termination property is satisfied i.e, that read() and
write() operations terminates. For the validity property we follow te same four steps as defined in Section
5.1.
Lemma 18 If a correct client ci invokes write(v) operation at time t then this operation terminates at time
t+ δ.
Proof The claim simply follows by considering that a write confirmation event is returned to the writer
client ci after δ time, independently of the behavior of the servers (see lines 03-04, Figure 12). ✷
Lemma 19 If a correct client ci invokes read() operation at time t then this operation terminates at time
t+ 2δ.
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Proof The claim simply follows by considering that a read() returns a value to the client after 2δ time,
independently of the behaviour of the servers (see lines 12-15, Figure 13). ✷
Theorem 5 (Termination) If a correct client ci invokes an operation, ci returns from that operation in finite
time.
Proof The proof simply follows from Lemma 18 and Lemma 19. ✷
To easy the next Lemmas let us use state the following result.
Lemma 20 Let [t, t+ 2δ] be a generic interval, then there are always at least #replyCUM correct servers
that reply during the [t, t+ δ] time interval.
Proof This follows considering the definition of minimum number of correct replies during a time interval
(cf. Corollary 2). Since does exist a tight protocol P solving a regular register in the (∆S,CAM) model,
then for Lemma 10, is it possible to apply values from Table 3 to compute the minimum number of correct
replies during the considered time interval, substituting values in each case the result is always at least
#replyCUM . ✷
Lemma 21 (Step 1.) Let Ti be the time at which mobile agent mai leave sc and let t ≤ Ti + 2δ the time
at which sc run the second maintenance() operation. Let v be the value stored at #echoCUM servers
sj /∈ B(t, t+ δ), v ∈ Vj∀sj /∈ B(t, t+ δ). At time t+ 2δ, at the end of the maintenance(), v is returned to
sc by the function select three pairs max sn(echo valsc).
Proof The proof follows considering that:
• the maintenance() employs a request-reply pattern and during such operation, by hypothesis, there
are #echoCUM servers that are never affected during the [t, t + δ] time period and are storing v at
time t+ δ. i.e., there are #echoCUM servers that deliver the ECHO REQ() message (the can be either
correct or cured) but are storing v in V at time t + δ such that the reply is delivered by sc by time
t+ 2δ.
• during themaintenance() operation can incorrectly contribute (k+1)f Byzantine servers, and (2k)f
servers that were Byzantine in [t− 4δ, t] time period, thus they could be still in a cured state 6.
• when the ECHO REQ() message is sent, sc uses a random number in order to be able to accept only
ECHO() message sent after t.
#echoCUM = (3k)f+1 > 3kf thus Byzantine servers can not force the select three pairs max sn(echo valsc)
function to return a not valid value so it returns v that occurs #replyCUM times, which is true since there
exist #echo CUM non faulty servers that reply to the ECHO REQ() message sending back v, concluding
the proof. ✷
In the sequel we consider γ ≤ 4δ. In the previous Lemma we proved that cured servers sc can get valid
values in 2δ time. Contrarily to all the previous model, the maintenance() operation is triggered each 2δ.
Thus a mobile agent, just before to leave could leave sc with the timer just reset and garbage in the echo setc
6We prove hereafter that γ ≤ 4δ, but to prove it we have first to prove that the maintenance() lasts 2δ time.
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and Vc sets, which does not allow sc to correctly terminate the operation. Thus sc has to wait 2δ before to
effectively starts a correct maintenance() operation. In the sequel we refer to the first maintenance as the
operation that may be ineffective and we refer to the second maintenance as the operation that allows a
cured server to retrieve and store valid values. It is straightforward that γ ≤ 4δ and the next Corollary just
follows.
Corollary 7 Protocol P implements a maintenance() operation that implies γ ≤ 4δ.
Lemma 22 (Step 2.) Let opW be a write(v) operation invoked by a client ck at time tB(opW ) = t then at
time t+ δ there are at least n− 2f > #replyCUM non faulty servers si such that v ∈Wi (so that when si
invokes conCut(Vi, Vsafei ,Wi) v is returned).
Proof When the WRITE() message is delivered by non faulty servers si, such message is stored in Wi and
a timer associated to it is set to 4δ, after that the value expires. For Lemma 1 in the [t, t + δ] time interval
there are maximum 2f Byzantine servers. All the remaining n − 2f non faulty servers execute the correct
protocol code, Figure 12 line 05 inserting v inWi. Since write() operations are sequential, during [t, t+ δ]
there is only one new value inserted inWi, which is returned by the function conCut() by construction. ✷
For simplicity, for now on, given a write() operation opW we call tB(opW ) + δ = twC the completion
time of opW , the time at which there are at least #replyCUM servers storing the value written by opW .
Lemma 23 (Step 3.) Let opW be a write() operation and let v be the written value and let twC be its time
completion. Then if there are no other write() operation, the value written by opW is stored by all correct
servers forever (i.e., v ∈ conCut(Vi, Vsafei ,Wi)).
Proof From Lemma 22 at time twC there are at least n− 2f > #replyCUM non faulty servers sj such that
v ∈Wi. For sake of simplicity let us consider Figure 14. Let us consider that:
• for Lemma 22, all non faulty servers si have v inWi at most at twC ;
• when si runs the next maintenance(), v is returned by select three pairs max sn(echo valsi) func-
tion at the end of such operation, and since it is the value with the highest sequence number (there
are no other write() operation) then v is inserted in Vsafei (cf. Figure 11 line 10), thus such value is
present in the ECHO() message replies for the next 2δ time;
• this is trivially true up to time t′ = t + 4δ, for the timer associated to each v in Wi. In [t, t
′] there
are 2k + 1 Byzantine servers, thus v ∈ Wj at n − (2k + 1) non faulty servers, and n − (2k + 1) =
(3k + 1)f + 1 = #replyCUM ≥ #echoCUM ;
• for each non faulty server the next maintenance() operation opM can happen either in [t
′, t′+ δ] or in
[t′ + δ, t′ + 2δ] (cf. Figure 14)s10 and s11 respectively:
– tB(opM ) ∈ [t
′, t′ + δ] (cf. s10 Figure 14): s10 starts opM1 before t
′ + δ, let us name it server
type A. This means that tB(opM−1)+ δ < t
′− δ, thus for Lemma 21, at the end of the operation
v ∈ Vsafe10 and during opM1 v ∈ V10;
– tB(opM ) ∈ [t
′+ δ, t′+2δ] (cf. s11 Figure 14): s11 starts opM1 after t
′+2δ let us name it server
type B. This means that tB(opM−1)+ δ > t
′, thus at the end of the operation we can not say that
v ∈ Vsafe10 but at least during opM−1 v ∈ V11.
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If all non faulty servers are type A, during opM1 all non faulty servers have v ∈ V and insert v in the ECHO()
message. The same happens if all non faulty servers are type B, during opM−1 , all of them inter v in the
ECHO()message and themaintenance() operation terminates with such value. If the situation is mixed, then
servers type B, when run opM−1 , deliver ECHO() messages from both type A and type B servers. Thus if
there are enough occurrence of v they can store v ∈ Vsafeb and during opM1 v ∈ Vb. During such operation
both servers type A and type B have vinV . Again, if there are enough occurrences of v, the operation ends
with v ∈ Vsafeb . It follows that servers type A, when run opM1 delivers ECHO() messages containing v
from both type A and type B servers. During the time interval [t′, t′ + 2δ] there are k correct servers that
are affected by mobile agent, cf. Figure 14, s5 and s6. At the same time there is server s0, type A, that
terminate its maintenanace() with v ∈ Vsafe0 , and thus compensates s5, allowing s1, type B, to terminate
the maintenanace() operation with v ∈ Vsafe1 , which compensates s6. This cycle, between type A and
type B servers can be extended forever. By hypothesis there are no more write() operation, thus all correct
servers have v ∈ Vsafe or V , and v is returned when servers invoke function conCut(). ✷
Lemma 24 (Step 3.) Let opW0 , opW1 , . . . , opWk−1 , opWk , opWk+1 , . . . be the sequence of write() operation
issued on the regular register. Let us consider a generic opWk , let v be the written value by such operation
and let twC be its completion time. Then v is in the register (there are #replyCUM correct servers that
return it when invoke the function conCut()) up to time at least tBWk+3.
Proof The proof simply follows considering that:
• for Lemma 23 if there are no more write() operation then v, after twC , is in the register forever.
• any new written value eventually is stored in an ordered set Vsafe and then V (cf. Figure 11 line 06 or
line 10) whose dimension is three.
• write() operation occur sequentially.
It follows that after three write() operations, opWk+1 , opWk+2 , opWk+3 in V Vsafe and W there are three
values whose sequence number is higher than the one associated to v, thus by construction conCut() does
not return v anymore, v is no more stored in the regular register. ✷
Theorem 6 (Step 4.) Any read() operation returns the last value written before its invocation, or a value
written by a write() operation concurrent with it.
Proof Let us consider a read() operation opR. We are interested in the time interval [tB(opR), tB(opR)+δ].
Since such operation lasts 2δ, the reply messages sent by correct servers within tB(opR) + δ are delivered
by the reading client. During [t, t + δ], for Lemma 20 there are at least #replyCUM correct servers that
reply. Now we have to prove that what those correct servers reply with is a valid value. There are two cases,
opR is concurrent with some write() operations or not.
- opR is not concurrent with any write() operation. Let opW be the last write() operation such that
tE(opW ) ≤ tB(opR) and let v be the last written value. For Lemma 23 after the write completion time twC
there are at least#replyCUM correct servers storing v (i.e., v ∈ conCut(Vj , Vsafej )). Since tB(opR)+2δ ≥
tCw, then there are#replyCUM correct servers replying with v (cf. Lemma 20), by hypothesis there are no
further write() operation and v has the highest sequence number. It follows that the last written value v is
returned.
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Figure 14: maintenance() operation opM1 analysis after a write() operation, t
′ = t+ 4δ. White rectangles
are maintenance() operation run by correct servers. In particular s10 runs such operation during the first δ
period after t′, while s11 runs it during the second δ period.
33
- opR is concurrent with some write() operation. Let us consider the time interval [tB(opR), tB(opR)+δ].
In such time there can be at most two write() operations. Thus for Lemma 24 the last written value before
tB(opR) is still present in #replyCUM correct servers and all of them reply (cf. Lemma 20) thus at least
the last written value is returned. To conclude, for Lemma 1, during the read() operation there are at most
(k + 1)f Byzantine servers and 2k cured servers 7, being #replyCUM = (3k + 1)f + 1 > (3k + 1)f then
Byzantine servers may not force the reader to read another or older value and even if an older values has
#replyCUM occurrences the one with the highest sequence number is returned, concluding the proof. ✷
Theorem 7 Let n be the number of servers emulating the register and let f be the number of Byzantine
agents in the (ITB,CUM) round-free Mobile Byzantine Failure model. Let δ be the upper bound on the
communication latencies in the synchronous system. If n ≥ (5k + 2)f + 1, then Preg implements a SWMR
Regular Register in the (ITB,CUM) round-free Mobile Byzantine Failure model.
Proof The proof simply follows from Theorem 5 and Theorem 6. ✷
Lemma 25 Protocol Preg is tight in the (ITB,CUM) model with respect to γ ≤ 4δ.
Proof The proof follows from Theorem 7 and Theorem 1, i.e., upper bound and lower bound match. In
particular Lower bounds are computed using the values in Table 3 to compute nCUMLB as defined in Table
2 for γ ≤ 4δ (cf. Corollary 7). ✷
6 Concluding remarks
We proposed lower bounds and matching upper bounds for the emulation of a regular register in the round
free synchronous communication model under unsynchronized moves of Byzantine agents. The computed
lower bounds are significantly higher than those computed for synchronized Byzantine agents model. Inves-
tigating other classical problems in the same fault model is a challenging path for future research.
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